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ABSTRACT
State-of-the-art deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial
examples, formed by applying small but malicious perturbations to the original
inputs. Moreover, the perturbations can transfer across models: adversarial ex-
amples generated for a specific model will often mislead other unseen models.
Consequently the adversary can leverage it to attack deployed systems without any
query, which severely hinder the application of deep learning, especially in the
areas where security is crucial.
In this work, we systematically study how two classes of factors that might influence
the transferability of adversarial examples. One is about model-specific factors,
including network architecture, model capacity and test accuracy. The other is the
local smoothness of loss function for constructing adversarial examples. Based
on these understanding, a simple but effective strategy is proposed to enhance
transferability. We call it variance-reduced attack, since it utilizes the variance-
reduced gradient to generate adversarial example. The effectiveness is confirmed
by a variety of experiments on both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the resurgence of neural networks, more and more large neural network models are applied
in real-world applications, such as speech recognition, computer vision, etc. While these models
have exhibited good performance, recent works (Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2014))
show that an adversary is able to fool the model into producing incorrect predictions by manipulating
the inputs maliciously. The corresponding manipulated samples are called adversarial examples.
More seriously, it is found that they have cross-model generalization ability, i.e. the adversarial
example generated from one model can fool another different model with a significant probability.
We refer to such property as transferability. In consequence, hackers can employ this property to
attack black-box systems with only limited number of queries (Papernot et al. (2016b); Liu et al.
(2016)), inducing serious security issue to deep learning system.
The adversarial vulnerability was first investigated By Szegedy et al. (2013), in which sophisticated
L-BFGS was used to generate adversarial examples. Later, a large number of attacks (Goodfellow
et al. (2014); Papernot et al. (2016a); Liu et al. (2016); Carlini & Wagner (2016); Chen et al.
(2017); Brendel et al. (2017)) are proposed. Among all the categories of attacks, those based on
transferability could be the most dangerous and mysterious, since they surprisingly do not require any
input-output query of the target system. Understanding the mechanism of adversarial transferability
could potentially provide various benefits for modern deep learning models. Firstly, for the already
deployed and vulnerable deep neural networks in real systems, it could help to design better strategies
to improve the robustness to the transfer-based attacks. Secondly, revealing the mystery behind the
transferability of adversarial examples could also extend the existing understandings on modern deep
learning, particularly on the effects of model capacity (Fawzi et al. (2015); Madry et al. (2017)) and
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model interpretability (Dong et al. (2017); Ross & Doshi-Velez (2017)). Therefore, studying the
transferability of adversarial example in the context of deep networks is of significant importance.
In this paper, we particularly focus on investigating two classes of key factors that might influence the
adversarial transferability. Inspired by these understandings, we deign a simple but rather effective
strategy for enhancing the transferability of adversarial examples. Our contributions are summarized
as follows.
• We numerically explore how adversarial transferability relies on the model-specific factors,
including the architecture, test accuracy and model capacity. First, it is found that adversarial
transfer is not symmetric, i.e. adversarial examples generated from model A can transfer to
model B easily does not means the reverse is also natural. This suggests that the explanation
based on the similarity of decision boundary is not sufficient, since similarity itself is a
symmetric quantity. Second, multi-step attacks seem to outperform one-step attacks in most
cases, which is contradictory to the finding in (Kurakin et al. (2016)). Last, we find that
adversarial examples generated from a large model appear less transferable than a small
model, under the condition they both have good test performance. Interestingly, this finding
seems closely related to the previous studies (Madry et al. (2017); Kurakin et al. (2016))
which showed large models are more robust than small ones.
We also investigate the influence of properties of loss surface. Specifically, our investigation
reveals that the local non-smoothness of loss surface harms the transferability of generated
adversarial examples. This is consistent with the study of obfuscated gradients (Athalye
et al. (2018)) and gradient masking (Trame`r et al. (2017a)).
• Based on previous investigations, we propose a simple but rather effective approach to
enhance the transferability. Inspired by the works (Smilkov et al. (2017); Balduzzi et al.
(2017)), we suggest applying the locally averaged gradient instead of the original one to
generate adversarial examples. We call it variance-reduced attack, since the local averaging
have the smoothing effect which suppresses the local oscillation of the loss surface. The
effectiveness of our method is justified on both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets, where
a large number of state-of-the-art architectures are tested. Different from ensemble-based
approaches proposed by Liu et al. (2016), our proposal does not require training lots of
extra models, which is typically overly expensive in practice. Moreover, we numerically
demonstrate that variance-reduced gradient can be combined with ensemble-based and
momentum-based (Dong et al.) approaches seamlessly for producing stronger attacks.
2 RELATED WORK
The phenomenon of adversarial transferability was first observed and investigated by Szegedy et al.
(2013). Goodfellow et al. (2014) showed that adversarial training can alleviate the transferability
slightly, which is recently extended and improved in ( Trame`r et al. (2017a)) by incorporating to
the adversarial examples generated by a large ensemble. Based on the transferability, Papernot
et al. (2016b;a) proposed a practical black-box attack by training a substitute model with queried
information. Liu et al. (2016) showed that targeted transfer is much harder than non-targeted one,
and additionally introduced the ensemble-based attacks. More recently, Dong et al. showed that
momentum can help to boost transferability significantly, and by utilizing this property, they won
the first-place in NIPS 2017 Non-targeted Adversarial Attack and Targeted Adversarial Attack
competitions. It is also worth mentioning the work by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016), which
demonstrated the exists of adversarial perturbations that have cross-sample transferability. Meanwhile,
there exist several works trying to explain the adversarial transferability. Papernot et al. (2016a)
contributed it to the similarity between data gradients of source and target models. By visualization,
Liu et al. (2016) suggested that the transferability comes from the similarity of decision boundaries.
Trame`r et al. (2017b) provided some systematic investigation of this similarity. Unfortunately,
similarity is symmetric and it cannot explain our finding that transfer is asymmetric.
Our proposed method enhances the transferability by utilizing informations in the small neighborhood
of the clean example, which is inspired by the works on shattered gradient (Balduzzi et al. (2017)) and
model interpretability (Smilkov et al. (2017)). Recently, similar strategies are also explored by Athalye
et al. (2018) and Warren He (2018) for white-box attacks, while we focus on the transferability. Our
method is also related to the work by Athalye & Sutskever (2017), which introduced the expectation
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over transformation (EOT) method to increase robustness. The EOT formulation is similar to our
objective (11), which increases the robustness against Gaussian noise. Chaudhari et al. (2016) suggest
that optimizing the landscape smoothed with respect to parameters can lead to solutions generalizing
better. Differently, we obtain adversarial perturbation with stronger transferability via smoothing
with respect to input x.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
We use f(x) : Rd 7→ RK to denote the function a model represents, where we omit the dependence
on the trainable model parameter θ, since it is fixed in this work. For many applications of interest,
we always have d  1 and K = O(1). According to the local linear analysis in Goodfellow et al.
(2014), it is the high dimensionality that makes f(x) vulnerable to the adversarial perturbation. That
is, considering the K-category classification problems as an example, for each x, there exists a small
perturbation η that is nearly imperceptible to human eyes, such that the i-th output fi(x) satisfies
argmax
i
fi(x) = y
true, argmax
i
fi(x+ η) 6= ytrue, (1)
where ytrue is the true label of the input x. We call η adversarial perturbation and correspondingly
xadv := x+ η an adversarial example.
The attack (1) is called a non-targeted attack since the adversary has no control over which class the
input x will be misclassified to. In contrast, a targeted attack aims at fooling the model to produce a
wrong label specified by the adversary, i.e.
argmax
i
fi(x+ η) = y
target.
In the black-box attack setting, the adversary has no knowledge of the target model (e.g. architecture
and parameters) and is not allowed to query input-output pairs from the model, i.e. the target model
is a pure black-box. However the adversary can construct adversarial examples on a local model
(also called the source model) that is trained on the same or similar dataset with the target model.
Then it deploys those adversarial examples to fool the target model. This is typically referred to as a
black-box attack, as opposed to the white-box attack whose target is the source model itself.
3.2 MODELS OF GENERATING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In general, crafting adversarial perturbation can be modeled as the following optimization problem,
maximizex′ J(x′) := J(f(x′), ytrue)
s.t. ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ ε, (2)
where J is some loss function measuring the discrepancy between the model prediction and ground
truth; ‖ · ‖ is certain norm metric to quantify the magnitude of the perturbation. For image data,
there is also an implicit constraint: x′ ∈ [0, 255]d, with d being the number of pixels. In practice, the
common choice of J is the cross entropy. Carlini & Wagner (2016) introduced a loss function that
directly manipulates the output logits instead of probability, which has been also adopted in many
works. As to the measurement of distortion, it should be chosen to encourage imperceptibility (Xiao
et al. (2018)). In this paper, the widely used `∞ norm is considered.
Ensemble-based attacks To improve the strength of adversarial transferability, instead of using a
single model, Liu et al. (2016) suggested using a large ensemble consisting of f1, f2, · · · , fQ as our
source model. Specifically, the non-targeted ensemble-based attack is given by
maximizex′ J(
Q∑
i=1
wifi(x
′), ytrue)
s.t. ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ ε,
(3)
where wj is the ensemble weight satisfying
∑Q
j=1 wj = 1. Following (Liu et al. (2016)), we choose
wj = 1/Q in this paper. The targeted counterpart can be derived similarly.
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3.3 OPTIMIZER
There are various optimizers to solve problem (2). Instead of using the classic optimizers, such
as Adam, SGD, etc. as in (Liu et al. (2016); Carlini & Wagner (2016)), we adopt a more efficient
Frank-Wolfe optimizer. In each iteration, we solve the linear approximation of objective function at
current solution xt in a constrained space,
st = argmax‖st‖≤εJ(xt) + 〈∇xJ(xt), st〉
xt+1 = projD(xt + α st)
(4)
where D = [0, 255]d ∩ {x′ | ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ ε} and α is the step size. For `∞ norm, the Eqn (4) has an
explicit solution given by
xt+1 = projD (xt + α sign(∇xJ(xt))) . (5)
The attack by evolving (5) for T steps is called iterative gradient sign method (IGSM). Kurakin
et al. (2016) and Madry et al. (2017) showed this method can generate strong adversarial examples.
Furthermore, the famous fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is a special case with α = ε, T = 1.
Kurakin et al. (2016) and Trame`r et al. (2017a) suggested that FGSM can generate more transferable
adversarial examples than IGSM. Therefore, both of them are considered in our work.
Momentum-based approaches Dong et al. recently proposed the momentum-based approaches
to enhance adversarial transferability. Specifically, the momentum iterative gradient sign method
(m-IGSM) is given by
gt+1 = µ gt +∇J(xt)/‖∇J(xt)‖1
xt+1 = projD (xt + α sign(gt)) ,
(6)
where µ is the decay factor of momentum.
3.4 EVALUATION OF ADVERSARIAL TRANSFERABILITY
Datasets To evaluate the transferability, three datasets including MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
are considered. For ImageNet, directly evaluation on the whole ILSVRC2012 validation dataset is
too time-consuming. Therefore, in each experiment we randomly select 5, 000 images that can be
correctly recognized by all the examined models.
TrainedModels (i) For MNIST, we trained fully connected networks (FNN) ofD hidden layers, with
the width of each layer being 500. For instance, the architecture of FNN width D = 2 is 784− 500−
500− 10. All the networks are trained to achieve 100% on training set, and test accuracies of them
are higher than 98%. (ii) For CIFAR-10, we trained five models: lenet,resnet20, resnet44, resnet56,
densenet, and test accuracies of them are 76.9%, 92.4%, 93.7%, 93.8% and 94.2%, respectively. (iii)
As for ImageNet, the pre-trained models are used provided by PyTorch, including resnet18, resnet34,
resnet50, resnet101, resnet152, vgg11 bn, vgg13 bn, vgg16 bn, vgg19 bn, densenet121, densenet161,
densenet169, densenet201, alexnet, squeezenet1 1. The Top-1 and Top-5 accuracies of them can
be found on website1. To increase the reliability of experiments, all the models have been tested.
However, for a specific experiment we only choose some of them to present since the findings are
consistent among the tested models.
Criteria Given a set of adversarial pairs, {(xadv1 , ytrue1 ), (xadv2 , ytrue2 ), . . . , (xadvN , ytrueN )}, we calculate
their Top-1 success rates (%) fooling a given model f(x) by
100× 1
N
N∑
i=1
1[argmax
i
fi(x
adv
i ) 6= ytruei ]. (7)
If f(x) is the model used to generate adversarial examples, then the rate indicates the the white-box
attack performance. For targeted attacks, each image xadv is associated with a pre-specified label
ytarget 6= ytrue. Then we evaluate the performance of the targeted attack by the following Top-1 success
rate (%),
100× 1
N
N∑
i=1
1[argmax
i
fi(x
adv
i ) = y
target
i ]. (8)
1http://pytorch.org/docs/master/torchvision/models.html
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The corresponding Top-5 rates can be computed in a similar way.
Attacks Throughout this paper the cross entropy 2 is chosen as our loss function J . We measure the
distortion by `∞ norm, both FGSM and IGSM attacks are considered.
4 HOW MODEL-SPECIFIC FACTORS AFFECT TRANSFERABILITY
Previous study on transferability mostly focused on the influence of attack methods (Liu et al. (2016);
Dong et al.; Trame`r et al. (2017b); Kurakin et al. (2016)). However it is not clear how the choice of
source model affects the success rate transferring to target models. In this section, three factors of
source model, including architecture, test accuracy and model capacity, are investigated.
4.1 ARCHITECTURE
Here we explore how the architecture similarity between source and target model contributes to the
transferability. This study is crucial since it can provide us guidance to choose the appropriate source
models for effective attacks. To this end, three popular architectures including ResNet, DenseNet
and VGGNet are considered, and for each architecture, two networks are selected. Both FGSM and
IGSM attacks are performed on ImageNet dataset. Table 1 presents the experiment results, and the
choice of hyper-parameter is detailed in the caption.
As we can see, in most cases IGSM outperforms FGSM significantly, especially when the source
and target models have the similar architecture. This observation contradicts the finding by Kurakin
et al. (2016) that multi-step attacks are somewhat less transferable than single-step attacks. However
for the attacks from VGGNets to all the ResNets and DenseNets, we do observe IGSM generate
adversarial examples weaker than FGSM (blue rates in the figure). So, in general, which method is
better should be similarity dependent.
Another finding is that the transfers between two models are non-symmetric, and this phenomenon is
more obvious for the models with different architectures. For instance, the success rates of IGSM
attacks from densenet121 to vgg13 bn is 58.7%, however the rate from vgg13 bn to densenet121 has
only 19.1%. Moreover, the success rates between models with similar architectures is much higher.
For example the success rates of IGSM attacks between vgg13 bn and vgg16 bn are higher than 90%,
nearly twice the ones of attacks formed by any other architectures.
Table 1: Top-1 success rates(%) of FGSM and IGSM attacks between pairs of models. The row and
column denote the source and target model, respectively. For each cell, the left is the success rate of
FGSM (ε = 15), while the right is that of IGSM (T = 5, α = 5, ε = 15).
resnet18 resnet101 vgg13 bn vgg16 bn densenet121 densenet161
resnet18 - 36.9 / 43.4 51.8 / 58.0 45.1 / 51.7 41.1 / 49.2 30.0 / 35.8
resnet101 48.5 / 57.2 - 38.9 / 41.6 33.1 / 40.0 33.2 / 46.9 28.7 / 43.2
vgg13 bn 35.5 / 26.8 14.8 / 10.8 - 58.8 / 90.7 19.1 / 15.9 13.8 / 11.7
vgg16 bn 35.2 / 26.1 15.6 / 11.1 61.9 / 91.1 - 21.1 / 16.8 15.8 / 13.2
densenet121 49.3 / 63.8 34.4 / 50.7 47.6 / 58.7 41.0 / 57.8 - 38.5 / 73.6
densenet161 45.7 / 56.3 33.8 / 54.6 48.6 / 56.0 41.3 / 55.9 43.4 / 78.5 -
4.2 MODEL CAPACITY AND TEST ACCURACY
We first study this problem in ImageNet dataset, with vgg19 bn3 chosen as our target model. A
variety of models are used as source models to perform both FGSM and IGSM attacks. The results
are displayed in Figure 1. The horizontal axis is the Top-1 test error, while the vertical axis is the
number of model parameters that roughly quantifies the model capacity. We can see that the models
2We also tried the loss described in Carlini & Wagner (2016) but did not find its superiority to cross entropy.
The reason might be that hard constraints, instead of soft penalizations, are used in our formulation.
3We also tried other nets, and the results show no difference.
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Figure 1: Top-1 success rates of FGSM(ε = 15) and IGSM (k = 20, α = 5, ε = 15) attacks against
vgg19 bn for various models. The annotated value is the percentage of adversarial examples that can
transfer to the vgg 19. Here, the models of vgg-style have been removed to exclude the influence of
architecture similarity.
with powerful attack capability concentrate in the bottom left corner, and the fooling rates are much
lower for those models with either large test error or large number of parameters.
The decision boundaries of high-accuracy models should be similar, since all of them approximate the
ground-truth decision boundary of data very well. On the contrary, a low-accuracy model must has a
decision boundary relatively different from the high-accuracy models. Therefore it is not surprising
to observe that high-accuracy models tend to exhibit stronger attack capability.
However it is somewhat strange that adversarial examples generated from deeper model appear
less transferable. To further confirm this observation, we conduct additional experiments on MNIST
and CIFAR-10. Table 2 shows the results, which is basically consistent with previous observation,
though there exists counter-examples, attacks from resnet44,resnet56 to resnet20. It suggests us not
to use deep models as the source models when performing transfer-based attacks, even though we still
can not fully understand it. It is also worth to mention that some works (Kurakin et al. (2016); Madry
et al. (2017)) observed a dual phenomenon that deeper models are more robust against adversarial
perturbations.
Table 2: Each cell (S,T ) denotes the Top-1 success rate of attack from source model S to target
model T .
(a) MNIST, FGSM attack with ε = 40
D = 0 D = 2 D = 4 D = 8
D = 0 - 62.9 62.9 64.4
D = 2 52.9 - 48.3 49.4
D = 4 47.3 43.1 - 44.8
D = 8 31.2 29.2 29.0 -
(b) CIFAR-10, FGSM attack with ε = 10
resnet20 resnet44 resnet56 densenet
resnet20 - 70.4 64.0 71.6
resnet44 65.4 - 57.1 65.8
resnet56 66.2 62.9 - 40.3
5 SHATTERED GRADIENTS
In previous section, we explore how model-specific factors influence the transferability of adversarial
examples. In this part, we systematically investigate how the smoothness of J(x) impacts the
transferability across models.
For simplicity, assume model A and B are the source and target models, respectively and let g(x) :=
∇J(x) be the gradient. Previous methods use gA(x) to generate adversarial perturbations, so the
transferability mainly depends on how much instability of gA can transfer to model B. The shattered
gradients phenomenon studied in (Balduzzi et al. (2017)) implies that gradient gA is very noisy,
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though the model is trained on training set very well. We hypothesize that the noise hurts the
transferability of gA, as illustrated in cartoon Figure 2(a). Since both model A and B have very
high test accuracy, their level sets should be similar globally, and JB is probably unstable along gA.
However, as illustrated in the figure, the local fluctuation of gA make the sensitivity less transferable.
One way to alleviate it is to smooth the landscape JA, thereby yielding a more transferable direction
GA, i.e. 〈GˆA, gˆB〉 > 〈gˆA, gˆB〉.
GA
gA
gB
〈GˆA, gˆB〉 > 〈gˆA, gˆB〉
model A
smoothed model A
model B
(a)
0 10 20 30 40 50
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A:vgg13 bn, B:vgg16 bn
A:densenet121, B:vgg16 bn
(b) (c)
Figure 2: (a) The three solid lines denote the level set of landscapes. The hatted vector denotes the
corresponding unit vector. (b) Cosine similarity between the gradients of source and target models.
(c) Visualization of decision boundaries. The origin corresponds to the clean image shown in Figure 6
of Appendix.
Inspired by the standard technique from distribution theory, we suggest to smooth the landscape as
follows,
Jσ(x) :=
∫
J(x− x′)ψσ(x′)dx′, (9)
where Jσ is the smoothed landscape, and the smoothing is achieved by convolution with a mollifier,
defined as a smooth function satisfying,
ψσ(x) = σ
−dψ(x/σ)
∫
Rd
ψ(x)dx = 1.
In this paper, the Gaussian mollifier, i.e. ψ(x) = 1
(2pi)d
e−‖x‖
2/2, is used, and the corresponding
gradient can be calculated by
Gσ(x) = Eξ∼N (0,σ2)[g(x+ ξ)]. (10)
This strategy has been employed by Smilkov et al. (2017) to improve the interpretability of gradient
saliency maps, which demonstrates that the local averaged gradient Gσ(x) is more informative
and interpretable than g(x). Here, we further show that Gσ(x) is more transferable than g(x) by
numerical experiments on ImageNet.
We first quantify the cosine similarity between gradients of source and target models, respectively.
Two attacks are considered: vgg13 bn→vgg16 bn, densenet121→vgg13 bn, which represent the
within-architecture and cross-architecture transfer, respectively. We choose σ = 15, and the expecta-
tion in (10) is estimated by using 1m
∑m
i=1 g(x + ξi). To verify the averaged gradients do transfer
better, we plot the cosine similarity between source and target model versus the number of samples m.
Figure 2(b) display the average similarity calculated from 5, 000 randomly selected samples, which
shows that the cosine similarity between GA and gB are indeed larger than the one between gA and
gB . As expected, the similarity increases with m monotonically, which further justifies that GA is
more transferable than gA.
Next, we visualize the transferability in Figure 2(c) by comparing the decision boundaries of resnet34
(model A, the source model) and densenet121 (model B, the target model). The horizontal axis
represents the direction of GA of resnet34, estimated by m = 1000, σ = 15, and the vertical axis
denotes orthogonal direction hA := gA − 〈gA, GˆA〉GˆA. Each point in the 2-D plane corresponds to
the image perturbed by u and v along each direction,
clip(x+ u GˆA + v hˆA, 0, 255),
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where x is the clean image. It can be easily observed that for resnet34 (model A), a small perturbation
in both directions can produce wrong classification. However, when applied to densenet121 (model
B), a large perturbation along hA cannot change the classification result, while a small perturbation
along GA can change the prediction easily. This further confirms that local averaging indeed extracts
the more transferable part of gA.
The above analysis implies that the local oscillation of loss surface do harm the transferability of
adversarial examples. This is similar to the phenomenon of gradient masking observed in the defense
of adversarial example (Trame`r et al. (2017a); Papernot et al. (2016c); Athalye et al. (2018)). Our
experiments suggest that gradient masking also exists for normally trained models to some extent, i.e.
shattered gradients. The noise contained in the shattered gradient makes the generated adversarial
examples less transferable.
6 VARIANCE-REDUCED ATTACK
6.1 METHOD
Previous study suggests to alleviate the shattering of gradients by optimizing the smoothed loss
function,
maximize Jσ(x′) := Eξ∼N (0,σ2)[J(x′ + ξ)]
s.t. ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ ε. (11)
Intuitively, this method can also be interpreted as generating adversarial examples that are robust to
Gaussian perturbation. We expect that the generated robust adversarial examples can still survive
easily in spite of the distinction between source and target model.
Using the iterative gradient sign method to solve (11) yields the following iteration formula:
Gt =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∇J(xt + ξi), ξi ∼ N (0, σ2I)
xt+1 = projD (xt + α sign (Gt)) ,
(12)
where Gt is a mini-batch approximation of Eξ∼N (0,σ2I)[∇J(x + ξ)]. Compared to IGSM, the
gradient is replaced by an averaged one, which removes the local fluctuation. Therefore we call this
method variance-reduced iterative gradient sign method (vr-IGSM). The special case T = 1, α = ε,
is accordingly called variance-reduced fast gradient sign method (vr-FGSM). For any other optimizer,
the corresponding variance-reduced version can be derived similarly. However, in this paper we only
consider IGSM and FGSM for simplicity.
6.2 EFFECTIVENESS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness over both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets.
Table 3: Top-1 success rates (%) of attacks between pairs of models. The row and column denote the
source and target model, respectively. For each cell, the left is the success rate of the normal attack
the right is that of corresponding variance-reduced attack. In this experiment, distortion ε = 10
(a) FGSM versus vr-FGSM (σ = 15,m = 100)
lenet resnet-20 densenet
lenet - 29.0 / 28.7 28.7 / 29.0
resnet-20 25.4 / 30.3 - 71.6 / 90.0
densenet 26.0 / 31.9 72.0 / 90.5 -
(b) IGSM(T = 5, α = 4) versus vr-IGSM(T =
5, α = 4,m = 20, σ = 15)
lenet resnet-20 densenet
lenet - 30.8 / 31.7 30.6 / 31.3
resnet-20 24.9 / 26.9 - 85.9 / 97.6
densenet 25.9 / 28.4 92.9 / 99.0 -
6.2.1 CIFAR-10
We first consider the adversarial transferability among three models: lenet, resnet-20 and densenet.
The test accuracies of them are 76.9%, 92.4% and 94.2% respectively. Table 3 shows, in general,
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variance-reduced gradient indeed improve the transfer rate consistently. In particular, the transfer-
ability between resnet-20 and densenet are enhanced significantly. However the variance-reduced
gradient does not help too much for the transfers from lenet to resnet-20 and densenet. It is interesting
to note that lenet has very weak attack capability, which probably is due to its low accuracy. It
does not learn the data very well, causing that its decision boundary be very different from the
high-accuracy model resnet20 and densenet. This is consistent with our finding in Section 4.2.
6.2.2 IMAGENET
Previous experiments show that our method indeed can improve the success rate. We now turn to the
more real dataset, imageNet. To make the experimental result reliable, both one-step and multi-step
methods, targeted and non-targeted attacks, single-model and ensemble-model based approaches are
examined.
Single-model based approaches Here we test both one-step and multi-step attacks, specifically
for multi-step attacks, we make the number of gradient calculation per sample be fixed 100 for a fair
comparison. The results of multi-step attacks are shown in Table 4 (readers can refer to Table 7 in
Appendix for the result of one-step attack). As we can see, our method enhance the transferability
dramatically for all the attacks. Please especially note those bold rates, where the improvement has
reached about 30%.
Table 4: Top-1 success rates(%) of non-targeted IGSM and vr-IGSM attacks between pairs of
models. The row and column denote the source and target model, respectively. For each cell,
the left is the success rate of IGSM (T = 100, α = 1), while the right is the that of vr-IGSM
(m = 20, σ = 15, T = 5, α = 5). In this experiment, distortion ε = 15.
densenet121 resnet152 resnet34 vgg13 bn vgg19 bn
densenet121 - 50.1 / 80.6 59.9 / 87.2 62.2 / 82.2 56.5 /84.3
resnet152 52.5 / 81.3 - 57.2 / 85.6 47.7 / 71.1 42.9 / 72.6
resnet34 51.5 / 76.4 46.5 / 73.1 - 53.8 / 74.8 49.1 / 74.5
vgg13 bn 24.1 / 49.2 14.3 / 33.5 25.1 / 54.1 - 90.6 / 96.4
vgg19 bn 27.1 / 57.5 16.7 / 41.6 27.6 / 60.7 92.0 / 96.1 -
Ensemble based approaches In this part, we apply the ensemble-based attack proposed by Liu
et al. (2016), which is rather effective in generating strong transferable adversarial examples. We
examine whether we can further improve its performance by employing our variance-reduced gradient.
Both targeted 4 and non-targeted attacks are considered. For non-targeted attacks, the Top-1 success
rates are nearly saturated; for targeted attacks, generating an adversarial example predicted by target
models as a specific label is too hard, resulting in a very small success rate. Therefore, we instead
adopt the the Top-5 success rate as our criterion to better reflect the improvement of method. A variety
of model ensembles are examined, and the results are summarized in Table 5 (The corresponding
Top-1 success rate can be found in Appendix).
As we can see, it is clear that variance-reduced attacks outperform the corresponding normal ones
by a remarkable large margin for both non-targeted and targeted attacks. More importantly, the
improvement never be harmed compared to single-model case, which implies that variance-reduced
gradient can be effectively combined with ensemble method without compromise.
Momentum-based approaches Momentum-based attacks are recently proposed by Dong et al.,
which won the first place in NIPS 2017 Non-targeted Adversarial Attack and Targeted Adversarial
Attack competitions. Here we compare our variance-reduced attacks with the momentum-based
attacks. In this experiment, three networks of different architectures are selected. The momentum
4Compared to non-targeted attack, we find that a larger step size α is necessary for generating strong targeted
adversarial examples. Readers can refer to Appendix A for more detailed analysis on this issue, though we cannot
fully understand it. Therefore a much larger step size than the non-target attacks is used in this experiment.
9
Technical Report
Table 5: Top-5 success rates (%) of ensemble-based approaches. The row and column denote the
source and target model, respectively. For each cell, the left is the rate of normal method, while the
right is that the variance-reduced counterpart. The corresponding Top-1 success rates can be found in
Appendix B (Table 8 and Table 9).
(a) Non-targeted attacks: IGSM (T = 200, α = 1) versus vr-IGSM (T = 10, α = 5,m =
20, σ = 15), distortion ε = 15.
Ensemble densenet121 resnet152 resnet50 vgg13 bn
resnet18+resnet34+resnet101 43.0 / 75.5 54.5 / 81.6 62.6 / 85.4 42.0 / 74.2
vgg11 bn +densenet161 40.5 / 73.5 18.5 / 56.4 33.4 / 70.2 68.3 / 85.6
resnet34+vgg16 bn+alexnet 26.5 / 65.2 15.7 / 55.3 33.8 / 72.8 77.8 / 89.9
(b) Targeted attacks: IGSM (T = 20, α = 15) versus vr-IGSM (T = 20, α = 15,m = 20, σ = 15),
distortion ε = 20.
Ensemble resnet152 resnet50 vgg13 bn vgg16 bn
resnet101+densenet121 28.1 / 56.8 26.2 / 52.4 7.7 / 23.6 8.1 / 29.7
resnet18+resnet34+resnet101+densenet121 50.4 / 70.4 54.7 / 72.4 23.2 / 44.2 28.1 / 52.6
vgg11 bn+vgg13 bn+resnet18
+resnet34+densenet121 24.3 / 55.8 36.9 / 65.9 - 62.2 / 83.5
decay factor µ = 1 is chosen as suggested in (Dong et al.), and for variance-reduced gradient, we use
m = 20, σ = 15. All attacks are iterated for T = 5 with step size α = 5. Table 6 reports the Top-1
success rates of non-targeted attacks of three attacks, including momentum-based IGSM (m-IGSM),
vr-IGSM and momentum-based vr-IGSM (m-vr-IGSM).
As shown in the table, our method outperforms momentum-based method significantly for all the cases.
Furthermore, by combining with the variance-reduced gradient, the effectiveness of momentum-based
method is improved significantly.
Table 6: Top-1 success rates(%) of non-targeted attacks. The row and column denote the source
and target model, respectively. Each cell contains three rates corresponding m-IGSM, vr-IGSM and
m-vr-IGSM, attacks respectively.
resnet18 densenet121 vgg13 bn
resnet18 - 65.6 / 73.1 / 86.5 70.4 / 77.7 / 86.7
densenet121 72.7 / 84.5 / 91.1 - 68.7 / 80.3 / 86.7
vgg13 bn 43.1 / 58.6 / 74.3 28.4 / 44.7 / 60.9 -
6.3 INFLUENCE OF HYPER PARAMETERS
In this part, we explore the sensitivity of hyper parameters m,σ when applying our variance-reduced
gradient methods for black-box attacks. We take ImageNet dataset as the testbed, and vr-FGSM
attack is examined. To increase the reliability, four attacks are considered here. The results are
shown in Figure 3. It is not surprising that larger m leads to higher success rate for any distortion
level ε due to the better estimation of the data-dependent direction of the gradient. We find there is
an optimal value of σ inducing the best performance. Overly large σ will introduce a large bias in
(12). Extremely small σ is unable to smooth the landscape enough. Moreover the optimal σ varies
for different source models, and in this experiment it is about 15 for resnet18, compared to 20 for
densenet161.
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Figure 3: (a) The sensitivity of the hyper parameter σ. (b) Success rates for nr-FGSM attacks with
different m.
6.4 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Since variance-reduced attacks can be viewed as generating adversarial examples robust against
Gaussian noise perturbation. Here we further examine their robustness to generic image transforma-
tions. The robustness is particularly important in practice, since it directly affects whether adversarial
examples can survive in the physical world (Kurakin et al. (2016); Athalye & Sutskever (2017); Lu
et al. (2017)). To quantify the influence of transformations, we use the notion of destruction rate
defined by Kurakin et al. (2016),
R =
∑N
i=1 c(xi)
(
1− c(xadvi )
)
c(T (xadvi ))∑N
i=1 c(xi)
(
1− c(xadvi )
) ,
where N is the number of images used to estimate the destruction rate, T (·) is an arbitrary image
transformation. The function c(x) indicates whether x is classified correctly:
c(x) :=
{
1, if image x is classified correctly
0, otherwise
And thus, the above rateR describes the fraction of adversarial images that are no longer misclassified
after the transformation T (·).
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Figure 4: Destruction rates of adversarial examples for various methods. For variance reduced attacks,
we choose m = 20, σ = 15. The distortion ε = 15.
Densenet121 and resnet34 are randomly chosen as our source and target model, respectively; and four
image transformations are considered: rotation, Gaussian noise, Gaussian blur and JPEG compression.
Figure 4 displays the results, which show that adversarial examples generated by our methods are
much more robust than those generated by vanilla methods. This numerical result is interesting, since
we only explicitly increase the robustness against Gaussian noise in generating adversarial examples.
This result suggests that the robustness of adversarial examples can also transfer among different
image transforms.
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first investigated the influence of model-specific factors on the adversarial transfer-
ability. It is found that model architecture similarity plays a crucial role. Moreover models with lower
capacity and higher test accuracy are endowed with stronger capability for transfer-based attacks. we
second demonstrate that the shattered gradient hinders the transfer of adversarial examples. Motivated
by the understanding, we proposed the variance-reduced attack which can enhance the transferability
of generated adversarial examples dramatically. Furthermore, the variance-reduced gradient can be
combined with both ensemble and momentum based attacks rather effectively. Lastly, we show that,
the adversarial examples generated by variance-reduced attacks are much more robust than normal
methods.
Our results imply that the robust (at least against Gaussian noise) adversarial examples tend to have
stronger cross-model generalization, i.e. transferability. The similar phenomenon is also studied
in learning theory (Bousquet & Elisseeff (2002); Roman Novak (2018)), i.e. the stable algorithm
and hypothesis always tend to generalize better as well. So it is worth to further investigate if
improving the robustness against generic transforms (Athalye & Sutskever (2017)) can enhance the
transferability as well.
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APPENDIX A: INFLUENCE OF STEP SIZE FOR TARGETED ATTACKS
When using IGSM to perform targeted black-box attacks, there are two hyper parameters including
number of iteration k and step size α. Here we explore their influence to the quality of adversarial
examples generated. The success rates are calculated on 1, 000 images randomly selected according
to description of Section 3.4. resnet152 and vgg16 bn are chosen as target models. The performance
are evaluated by the average Top-5 success rate over the three ensembles used in Table 5(b).
Figure 5 shows that for the optimal step size α is very large, for instance in this experiment it is about
15 compared to the allowed distortion ε = 20. Both too large and too small step size will yield harm
to the attack performances. It is worth to note that with small step size α = 5, the large number of
iteration provides worse performance than small number of iteration. One possible explanation is
that more iterations lead the optimizer to converge to a more overfitted solution. In contrast, a large
step size can prevent it and encourage the optimizer to explore more model-independent area, thus
more iteration is better.
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Figure 5: Average success rates over three ensembles for different step size α and number of iteration
k. The three ensembles are the same with those in Table 5(b). Distortion ε = 20.
APPENDIX B: SOME ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Figure 6: The image used to perform decision boundary analysis. Its ID in ILSVRC2012 validation
set is 26, with ground truth label being table lamp.
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Table 7: Top-1 success rates(%) of non-targeted FGSM and vr-FGSM attacks between pairs of
models. The row and column denote the source and target model, respectively. The left is the success
rate of FGSM, while the right is that of vr-FGSM (m = 20, σ = 15). In this experiment, distortion
ε = 15.
densenet121 resnet152 resnet34 vgg13 bn vgg19 bn
densenet121 - 34.4 / 66.7 46.2 / 74.5 53.0 / 72.5 44.9 /71.4
resnet152 39.2 / 67.2 - 45.4 / 71.3 43.3 / 62.4 36.8 / 61.5
resnet34 46.3 / 71.1 38.4 / 66.4 - 54.4 / 70.5 46.7 / 68.8
vgg13 bn 23.0 / 48.4 16.0 / 34.4 28.0 / 53.2 - 54.2 / 84.6
vgg19 bn 28.1 / 58.8 18.7 / 46.4 31.5 / 62.3 62.2 / 87.1 -
Table 8: Top-1 success rates (%) of ensemble-based non-targeted IGSM and nr-IGSM attacks. The
row and column denote the source and target model, respectively. The left is the success rate of IGSM
(T = 100, α = 3), while the right is that of vr-IGSM (T = 50, α = 3,m = 20, σ = 15). Since
targeted attacks are much more difficult, we choose ε = 20.
Ensemble densenet121 resnet152 resnet50 vgg13 bn
resnet18+resnet34+resnet101 87.8 / 97.8 94.6 / 98.9 97.4 / 99.4 84.1/96.1
vgg11 bn+densenet161 86.8 / 97.2 62.9 / 89.7 80.3 / 94.8 94.9 / 98.4
resnet34+vgg16 bn+alexnet 68.9 / 91.3 54.6 / 87.2 77.9 / 96.2 98.1 / 99.1
Table 9: Top-1 success rates (%) of ensemble-based targeted IGSM and vr-IGSM attacks. The row
and column denote the source and target model, respectively. The left is the success rate of IGSM
(T = 20, α = 15), while the right is that of vr-IGSM (T = 20, α = 15,m = 20, σ = 15). Since
targeted attacks are harder, we set ε = 20.
Ensemble resnet152 resnet50 vgg13 bn vgg16 bn
resnet101+densenet121 11.6 / 37.1 11.9 / 34.5 2.6 / 10.5 2.6 / 14.1
resnet18+resnet34+resnet101+densenet121 30.3 / 55.2 36.8 / 57.3 10.8 /29.1 12.8/35.0
vgg11 bn+vgg13 bn+resnet18+
resnet34+densenet121 10.1 / 35.1 22.2 / 47.9 - 42.1/72.1
15
